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Introduction 
There is a widespread public belief that unions are the most 
significant factor causing price increase. It is explained by the 
fact that unions always ask for higher wages with the result that 
increasing the cost of production pushes uo prices. 
The traditional wage theory explains wage increases by means 
of the free forces of the market. folages depend on the market supply 
and demand for labor when market is in full em9loyment. Unemployraent 
is either frictional, or it arises from rigid money wage. 
. According to A.w. Phillips who was influenced by the traditional 
wage theory, the rate of change of money wages is explained by 
the level of unemployment at the macro level. The rate of change 
of wages is approximately proportiona� to the excess demand for labor. 
The purpose or this paper is to study the factors affecting 
wage change in one industry: the first part of this paper is devoted 
to the explanation and analysis of tha history of unionism and collec­
tive bargaining in the steel industry. The second part sets up a model 
for wage changes in the same industry. The model depends on three 
variables: wage behavior, market structure, and government intervention. 
It is hard to show how much one factor, apart from, and perhaps in 
opposition to other factors, may affeo t the wage changes. In recent 
years, the government has increased _its intervention in the disputes 
of the steel industry, for steel has strategic �portance as a basic 
component in defense mechanism. 
ii 
The model will be tested empirically in an attempt to corrollate 
these factors, using multiple regression analysis, in order to learn 
what the most significant factor is in the steel industry. 
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Introduction to the First Part 
In this part of the pap9r I shall try to study the development 
of the union of Steelworkers in America, and its structure, or the 
pattern of collective bargaining throughout the years. 
This paper begins with a national labor movement, the Knights 
of Labor, then the creation of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and 
Steelworkers. This includes the years from 1876 to 1910 and shall 
examine the characteristics of this period. 
Next, the period of 1910-1930 and the new governmental approach 
toward labor--to guarantee the working man his right to organize. 
In doing this, the government attempted to gain the �orkers' support. 
Thirdly, the period between 1930 and 19L1-5 was when the government 
took a step to legislate the L.3.bor Act to guarantee the workers the 
right to organize. Also, during this era, the c.r.o. took the 
initiative to completely reorganize the steelworkers. 
Then, the fourth period is between 1945 and 1959, when the 
bargaining structure of the Union actually developed and took the 
shape of nation-wide bargainin8. 
Finally, the fifth period was from 1960 to 1965. This period 
is characterized.by more governmental intervention to prevent nation-
wide strikes in the steel industry and to work for more peaceful settlements. 
2 
Knights of Labor 
The labor movement has a long history in the United States. 
:Laborers had organized into unions to prevent unfair treatment by the 
employers, suoh as: wage reduction; working hours; conditions of work; 
and so forth. The new frontier of labor activity, however, was the 
establishment of a lobr federation, and on December 28, 1869, tho Knights 
of Labor was founded. Mr. Uriah S. Stephens was elected Master workman, 
the highest office in the order.1 Mr. Stephens, born in 1821 and educated 
for the Baptist ministry, later became apprenticed to a tailor. 
During his career Mr. Stephens also taught school and traveled extensively 
in Central and South America. Mr.· Stephens draw from his religious 
baokground the vision of the universality of labor which was symbolized 
in the mysticism of the Knights of Labor's secret ritual.2 Ho had
. 
great respect for industry and he was opposed to boycotts and/or strikes 
whose benefits he felt were "partial and evanescent.11 
The Knights of Labor formed various district assemblies in order 
to attain the ultimate goal of labor unity. As time passed, many local 
assemblies were established, mixed assemblies composed of workers from 
different trades. Then the Steelworkers joined the Knights. The first 
general convention was held in Reading, Pennsylvania, in January, 1878, 
with thirty-three delegates. The constitution adopted included many of 
the traditional demands of organized labor and some new goals. It called 
for the establishment of cooperatives, the reservation of public lands 
tor actual settlers and the eight hour work day. It also demanded 
abolition of the contract system for prison labor, the prohibition of 
1Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in. American History, Harper & Row, . 
Publisher, N.Y., p. 8). 
2Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor !!l America, Thomas Y. Crowell Co, N.Y•• 
p. 129. 
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child labor, equal pay for the sexes, the establishment of bureaus 
of labor statistics, and by later amendment, government owhership of the 
1 railways and telegraphs, and adoption of a graduated income tax. As 
far as industrial action was concerned, the Knights of Labor supported 
boycotts, but strongly favored arbitration rather than resorting to 
strikes (which they had at first wholly opposed). The Knights con-
sequently became involved in strikes in spite of themselves, when the 
local assemblies were threatened by retaliatory measures on the part 
of industry; and when the Knights had no solution regarding the problem 
of how arbitration was to be enforced. 
Mr. Terence V. Powderly succeeded Mr. Stephens as Grand Ma.star 
Worlanan of the Knights. He had to deal with such innuediate and practical 
issues as shorter hours and higher wages--some of the Knights• objectives. 
He opposed strikes, believing it a costly remedy to both the employer 
and the employees. Sometimes he had as the Grand Ma.star Workman, a 
responsibility in supporting the strikers. Thus by the Spring of 1886, 
the Knights of Labor appeared to have taken control of the entire labor 
movement, to be virtually all-powerful. The public viewed the Knights of 
Labor as a closely controlled and disciplined organization that could 
I • 
apparently win any contest against the employer. � 
Unfortunately, ·the success of the Knights of Labor did not extend 
beyond the year of 1885 when affairs were progressing badly for the 
workers. It was clear that everything had changed and industry quickly 
took advantage of every opportunity--it rolled back labor's earlier gains.· 
1 Dulles, Op. Cit. p. 132. 
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The Knights had. indeed. created a solidarity among the workers 
that had been but dimly felt before their advent. and they offered 
a challenge to the power of industry that revealed as never before 
the inherent strength of organization.1 But whatever merit the 
Knights of Labor might possess. it obviously did not answer the need 
of the trade unions for a trade union federation divorced from other 
2 kinds of labor societies. 
So, next one specific trade union shall be discussed--the 
steel industry trade union. 
1nuues. Op. Cit.·, p. 148. 
2 
Taft. Op. Cit., p. 92. 
5 
Period I--Up to 1910 
In the early days. trade unions were organizations that protected 
the skilled laborer. Steel industry laborers were no different. 
There were three basic trade unions that covered �11 the skilled 
metal.ma.king crafts in the mills. They are the Sons of Vulcan. the 
Heaters• and Rollers• Union and Roll Hand's Union. For the sake of 
amity and mutual support during strikes, the three unions joined to-
gather in 1876 to form the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel 
Workers.1 The main strength of the Association rested in the iron 
mills west.of the Alleghenies; in Pittsburgh, for example, both the 
Homestead and Jones and Laughlins workers were organized. 
The Union suited very well the needs of the industry. However, 
it neglected annual uniform scales for the Western mills, equalized 
hours, output, and working conditions. Consequently. homestead was 
one of the starting points of steel workers' unrest. One day after 
the furnaces had all been charged with ingots, all work ceased and 
then the workers asked for some demands which ha.d been previously 
refused. Result--the workers got their demands fulfilled.2 
Before the year was over the workmen were asked to withdraw 
... 
from the Onion and join labor union or be subject to dismissal from 
the company's services. Most of these men were members of the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers. The next step was 
a strike which began January 1, 1882. After the workers ha.d been idle 
a week, the Company gave notice that the men could not return to work, 
1 
Brody, David, Steel Workers in America, TI!! Nonunion�. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 50. 
2Bridge, James Howard, �Inside Histo:r,y 2£ tho Carnegie Steel £2.:., 
The Aldine Book Company, New York, 1903, p. 1.54. 
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even if they signed the agreement, unless they would accept a reduction 
of wages. This intensified the bitterness of the workers, and the 
Amalgamated Association took cognizance of the dispute. Also, the strike 
was carried on throughout the Pittsburgh district. The newspapers reported 
both sides of the argument: each party in the dispute published daily 
columns of protests, accusations, and even threats. Finally, an appeal 
was made by outside interests to the other owners, who, publicly acknow­
ledging that they ware powerless, nevertheless interceded between the 
employer and the strikers, insisting upon a settlement. 
On March 20, 90ace was reached--actually almost a compromise, but 
a victory for the men. A few weeks later, the Amalgamated Association, 
.encouraged by its current success, demanded wage increases for all iron 
and steel workers throughout the country. June 1, 1882, was the first 
day of this strike. Work was suspended in ali mills where union laborers 
were employed. The strike continued until September by which time 
everyone was tired of it and the workers had even been dropping from the 
Amalgamated Association. The unrest of the workmen in Homestead increased 
the discontent of the stockholders and they sold out to the Carnegie 
group in October, 1883. 
In addition, tension had been mountin� between theJ'ina.nager and 
the workman. In 1889. another strike occurred. This time wage increase 
was the main issue. The strike was settled and the contract signed 
was for a three year period which ended in 1892, in time for the 
largest Homestead strike yet. 
The wage debate leading to the Homestead strike of 1892 demonstrated 
the complexities of the company as it demanded cuts for 325 skilled men.1 
1 Brody, Op. Cit., p. 53. 
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The company argument depended upon: (1) that some main improve!110nts 
in the work increased the output and reduced the work; (2) that the pay 
scale had been more than that of their competitors; (3) the company 
had invested more money in new machines and they were entitled to some 
of the benefits. The Amalgamated Association, on the other hand, did 
not emphasize wages, but did emphasize costs and profits. It also pointed 
out that the company's cost was less than that of its competitors. 
Both sides had legitimate arguments, but Carnegie wanted the 
Amalgamated Association to liquidate. Mr. Carnegie drafted a notice 
breaking his connections with the Amalgamated Association because a 
"firm cannot run Union and Nonunion, n1 and that no further conferences 
should be held with the workmen after June 24, 1892. On June 23, 
at the last conference, neither side was yet willing to yield on any 
other points. The conference bro�e up .and preparations were made for 
the struggle. It is interesting to note that at this time the differences 
between the firm and its workmen were truly insignificant. Anotheit 
factor was that the general rolling mill scales were also under discussion 
and the Amalgamated Association feared that any concessions at Homestead 
would weaken it in its contest with the iron mills throughout the country. 
Jl Another item to be mentioned here was the fact th.at of the 3,800 men 
employed at Homestead, only 325 were directly affected by the wage cut. 
Of the remaining number, which was 3,500, about 3,000 of them did not 
belong to the Amalgamated Association and they had already signed a three 
year agreement with the company the previous week. However, they broke 
their contracts and joined the dissatisfied workers in their struggle.2 
1 Brody, Op. Cit., p. 55. 
2Bridge, Op. Cit., p. 209. 
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As it was, the strike continued with the strikers keeping the 
owners from lawful possession of the plants. The manager of the 
Homestead requested three hundred guards to forcibly reopen the 
plants to non-union men on July 6. Determined to keep the plant 
closed, the strikers organized a military line and virtually took 
control of the town. Forewarned by an elaborate alarm system, they 
were prepared when barges attempted to slip into the plants under 
the cover of darkness. The detective agents, Pinkerton's, ware met by 
a barrage of gunfire. The strike:z,s won only a pyrhic victory as it led 
to the arrival of the militia and the reopening the works.r 
But this incident was not the first time that the Carnegie 
management requested outside aid. In the 1889 strike, the company 
sent one hundred deputy-sheriffs to take possession of the works. 
The strikers disarmed them, shipping them back to Pittsburgh minus 
coats and caps. This strike was ended on November 17, and the Union 
was out of the Carnegie mills. All attempt of organizing had been 
crushed by Carnegie and they threatened to stop work if necessary. 
Other steel mills had followed Carnegie in wage cuts, which 
was accepted by the Association. Thus, by 1900, not a steel plant 
of consequence in Western Pennsylvania recognized the Association. 
By 1903 at Mingo Junction, Ohio, the last of the great steel plants 
became nonunion, so that as a result, the Association was limited 
to skilled men. Its strength lay in its control of the supply of 
vital steel ma.king skills. 
1 Brody, Op. Cit., p. 59. 
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In 1900 some steel industries merged together under the title 
of the Steel Industry Corporation. The Amalgamated Association, 
trying to take advantage of this situation started a strike in 1901. 
However, it was a failure, and almost the complete downfall of the 
Association. The weakness of the Amalgamated Associ:..·�:_c..:: was manifest. 
Handicapped in depressed periods by their contracts, independent firms 
found it relatively easy to break With the Association at a time 
when many skilled men were unemployed and eager to work. The Union 
lost altogether about thirty lodges and four thousand men in the 
1904 recession. The months after the panic of 1907 were equally 
disastrous. Thus, when prosperity returned in the spring of 1909, 
the Amalgamated Association had the strength neither to benefit the 
steel corporation nor effectively to oppose it.1 
This era up to 1910 is chara�terized by two points: 
1. The steelmakers could congratulate themselves on the 
success of breaking. labor organizations. Up until 1910, the steel 
companies were opposed to any organized labor union. They tried to 
stop the laborers from organizing, believing that a Union was a 
serious obstacle to efficiency. 
,.. 
2. The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steelworkers was 
mainly a skilled labor union. Every time there was an attempt to 
entice the unskilled workers to join in the organization, it al-
ways ended· in failure for the organization. The fact of the matter 
was that most of these unskilled workers were immigrants, and work 
to them had different objectives. 
1 
Brody, Op. Cit., p. 71. 
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Immigrants 
Until 1900. only English-speaking people immigrated to America. 
But. after that date immigrants fr�m_South and Eastern Europe began 
to arrive in increasing numbers. 
The structure of the immigration is: (1) most of the immigrants 
were peasants, qr, inheritance an� tradition; (2) consequently. they 
were unskilled steel workers; and (3) they came to America, hoping 
to earn some money to buy a piece of land at home· and go back.1 
Comparing wages received in America with those back home, the 
immigrants found that the wages in America ware higher and were well-
worth immigrating. The fact of the matter was that such wages were 
far below the minimum for family existence, but the immigrant steel 
workers, not expecting to support families in America, mainly came 
alone and left their families behind. 
Working in America was not easy. Only the hardier men immigrated 
and such were glad to work extra days. Their philosophy was 
work all the time, go home and sleep, you do not have to spend, 
therefore you save more. However, a fat pay envelope overshadowed 
heavy labor, long working hours, and the consolation that the hard 
, 
life was only temporary--a few years sacrifice in exchange for 
competence at home. As a result, stability in the unskilled ranks 
rested on mobility. The newcomers either moved up into the skilled 
force, or they moved out of the steel industry at the first depression 
·2 or with a satisfactory accumulation. 
1Brody, Op. Cit.,_p. 97. 
2 Ibid • •  PP• 108-109. 
To the employer, immigrants were the floating supply of 
labor. He did not care about their welfare. Also, the presence 
of immigrants limited the jobs socially appropriate for native 
workers. 
11 
To the Union, the Amalgamated Association, had formed the 
sources of strength in the mill towns. But also there was no 
interest in trade unionism among recent immigrants in steel towns. 
Period II--1910-1930 
Beginning with the ye�r 1914, the labor system for steel 
workers had changed. A main factor was the world war which pro-
foundly altered the situation for three reasons: (1) because of 
the ·labor shortage, immigration slowed down, (2) the demand for 
1 2  
steel increased, and (J) for the first time the federal government 
intervened to guarantee the working man's rights to organize. Mr. 
Wilson, Secretary of Labor, said, "I am for the laboring man. Justice 
must be done him or there can be no justice in the country. ul 
Wilson's propaganda presented its special appeal to trade unionism. 
Worker unrest ha.d been fruitful because steel rren cannot afford 
any strike. To reduce the labor unrest, steel men responded by 
increasing wages. Steel men also thought of other things to over-
come the shortage of labor; and an example was Negro migration from the 
South to the North. This, however, did not work out for a simple 
reason that Negroes were not accustomed to hard work. Another thing 
that aggrivated the situation was the drafting of young men. 
The Americanization movement was adopted by the steel companies 
who could not afford to lose any of their European immigrants. This 
,; 
movement involved various aspects: special housing for the immigrant, 
welfare projects, increased wages, and aid in becoming American citizens. 
In 1917 the government, trying to insure essential output, had 
to again intervene to win the workers• support and to prevent further 
strikes. The government assigned labor and management to a War 
Labor Conference Board, which later ha.d unanimous agreement upon a 
set of principles to govern future labor ralations. Upon its 
1 
Brody, Op. Cit .• , p. 20). 
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reconunendation, the president in April, 1918, approved the National 
War Labor Board to serve as a final court of appeal to settle all 
industrial disputes that could not be resolved through any other 
means.1 This board was composed of five representatives from labor 
and five from management. The National War Labor Board policy was 
a reflection of the government's new friendly attitudes toward labor, 
which was shown in the labor legislation. In return, there were to 
be no further strikes or lockouts .for the duration of the war. 
When the war was over, the steel manufacturers were thoroughly 
alarmed and prepared to fight the spread of unionism. Employers. 
who in many instances had been compelled during wartime to recognize 
unions and deal with them, were now anxious to throw off the shackles 
imposed by such organizations. 
But the grievances of the steelworkers ware: (1) the mass 
dismissals which spread throughout the country, especially between 
active union members; (2) the long working hours; and (3) the right to 
unionize. Union leaders had attempted to approach employers to discuss 
with them such grievances, but industry leaders refused to meet with 
union leaders. Then the union leaders appealed to the president, which 
was also unsuccessful, 'to get the industry leaders to mJet with them. 
The union, calling for a meeting in Pittsburgh on July 20, 1919, to 
plan for a strike vote, overwhel!ningly voted for a strike. 
So the strike began on Septemb?r 22, 1919. The steel mills were 
almost completely shut down in several places. The strike ended on 
January 5. 1920. But, the popular view of the strike had two 
1 
Dulles, Op. Cit • •  p. 226. 
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fateful consequences: (1) it excluded government intervention and 
the public support was totally absent in 1919; and, (2) the result 
of the national hysteria enabled the· steel manufacturers to exercise 
complete freedom of action during th3 strike.
1 
Conversely, the unpopularity of the st�ike, or the failure of 
it, could be attributed to sev�ral reasons. The first was that the 
president had urged the union to postpone the strike, to create 
another opportunity for industry to change its.position, but the 
union refused. 
The second reason was the personality of Mr. William z. Foster, 
a member of the Chicago local union of the Brotherhood of Carmen and 
later the Secretary of the National Committee for Organizing the 
Iron and Steel Workers. Mr. Foster had been accused of radical points 
of view because he published a pamphlet, in 1911, concerning Lyndicalism 
attacking capitalism. Unfortunately for the union, Mr. Foster's 
radical p�st was brought up again because he was a key figure in the 
strike. The steel industry leaders had used this information to 
demonstrate that the steel strike was a radical conspiracy. 
The third reason was strikebreakers. On October 9, of the strike, 
, 
according to union sources, it was claimed that 367,000 workers 
were out. However, the companies questioned this figure, insisting 
that most of the strikers were unskilled workers who could be easily 
replaced.2 Thus, in late October nu.�bers of _Negroes began appearing 
in steel centers; the strikers ware convinced that the inexperienced 
Negro would do more harm than good in the mills. 
1 
Brody, Op. Cit., PP• 248-249. 
2 
Taft, Op. Cit., P• 357. 
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It is very interesting to mention that the National Committee 
noted that the immigrants had proved to be devoted to their obli­
gations during the strike.1 In fact, they were the last ones to 
surrender. Also worth noting is that the skilled steelworkers were 
the soft flank in the strikers• ranks, so that some of them had 
returned to work before the official end of the strike. 
The collapse of the strike was a crucial defeat for the unions. 
Nothing now mattered more than the morale of the steel workers, and 
lacking as they did in trade union discipline and strike benefits, 
no work was available for these active strikers. The steel companies, 
having rooted out the agitators, were eager to restore good feeling. 
Wages had increased, and welfare programs were initiated. The Twenties 
witnessed a total reconstruction of the pre-war labor situation. 
But, as for the Amalgamated Association, its wartime gains quickly 
evaporated in the hostile air of the Twenties. 
1Brody, Op. Cit., p. 260. 
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Period III--1930-1945 
Up to 1930 the labor policy had functioned upon two premises. 
The first was an attempt to prevent the spread of unionism and to destroy 
it by the discharging and blacklisting of the active union members. 
Al.so included with this was espionage ·within the union and a studied 
policy for an efficacious 0mise" of ethnic groups. The second concern 
was to win the loyalty of the employee, through welfare, fringe 
1 benefits, and paternalism. 
The collapse of the stock market in October 1929, signaled the 
beginning of a severe decline in business and employment. Total gross 
product dropped sharply which led to a drastic decline in income, which 
in turn resulted in continually increasing unemployment. A research 
study conducted by the AFL in February 1928,2 called attention to the 
increasing unemployment among organized wo�kers. This presented a 
danger sign for union members who, in the 1920's were predominately 
skilled workers and therefore generally not among the first to be 
laid off. It was not until 1933 that the National Industrial Recovery 
Act was passed with its Section 7 (a) guaranteeing workers the right 
to organize and bargain through representatives of their own choosing 
without interference or coertion by the employers. 
Immediately following the depression, there were internal 
difficulties within the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and 
Tin Workers. These difficulties had been raised by a militant 
rank-and-file- movement which had been developing within the steel 
centers demanding for an organized union for the steel industry. 
1 
Robert Livernash, Collective Bargaini� in the Basic Steel 
Industry, U.S. D9pt. of Labor, January, 19b1, P:- 5b. 
2 Taft, Op. Cit., p. 411. 
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John L. Lewis and his associates of the United ¥. ine Workers of America 
believed th·it the fate of Unionism in the Captive Coal lfiners of U .s. 
Steel depended in a large part upon a supporting organization in basic 
steel.1 At the convention of the A.F.L. in 1934, Mr. Lewis asked the A.F.L. 
to conduct a campaign of organization in the iron and steel industry. At 
the 1935 cor.venti0n, the A.F.L. refused to interfere due to the A.F.L. 
internal difficulties. In 1936, !fr. Le w is offered $500,0002 ( equal to 1/3 
of the A.F.L. fund) as a contribution from the Yd.neworkers to organize 
steelworkers, but the A.F .L. turned dow"'n the offer. Hr. Lewi s thereupon 
began dealing directly with the Amalgamated in the name of the c.r.o. 
which was formed in November of 1935. 
The Steel Workers Organizing Conurd.ttee (SWOC) was formed in 1936. 
It was recognized by the corporations as the bargaining agent for its 
members. The SWOC was not an autonomous, r.i0mber-controlled union. It 
was influenced by the United Mine workers of America who supplied the 
greater·part of its finances and staff, and the imprint of the miners 
was discernable in its early leadership, attitudes, and tactics. There 
was a tight control from the top which took the form of a benevolent 
autocracy .3 
The success that SWOC had with the major fi�m was�exemplified 
when the U.S. Ste0l, desiring a cont�act, was unbalanced by '�ittle 
steel" companies; ( P..Gpublic, Youngstown. Sheet and Tube, Inland, 
Bethlehem and National) . They resisted a signed agreement, and 
ensuing strikes began in May of 1937. 
1Livernash, Op. Cit. , p. 74. 
2
Benjamin Stolberg, The Sto�y £!:.the C.I.O., Viking Press, N. Y., 
1938. p. 70. 
Jr. ivernash, Op. Cit. , p. 77. 
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The organizers believed that the cost of a strike would be less 
than the be!1efits of future nonunionization. However, strike 
failed for the following reasons: 
1. SWOC was not yet prepared, ooneywise and experience wise, 
to call the strike in a broad front. 
2. The SWOC's members were inexperienced. 
). The strike was during an economic downturn, making it:easier· 
for the companies to close the mills. 
It was not so much attributable to the failure of Si>JOC with 
the 'Little steel" But also to the renewal of the U.S. Steel contracts 
in 1938, that public SU'?port of the C.I.O. had weakened the economic 
recession and that "Little ste0l" was dote�mi.ned to refuse SWOC 
signed agreements until legally raquir0d to do so. Indeed, it was 
not until 1942, and then with gove�nment help and the added stimulus 
of wartirns emergencies, that signed agreerr.ants wera achieved . 1942 
was the yaar the United Steelworkers of America �s formed to take over 
the Amalgamated Association of ��on and Steel �nd become the negotiating 
power. It was the changing attitudes of the industry to accept reality 
and endure the situation, as Hr. John A. Stephens, Vice-presidant for 
,; 
industrial relations at U.S. Steel, had said, 0 • • •  there is incumbent 
on management the responsibility of making the union relationships 
as responsible, agreeable, and constructive �s is possible, without 
deviation from sound principles or compro�ise with what is right. It 
is, of course, essential that principles not be confused with prejudicies.111 
1 
Ibid., p. 64. 
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Some conditions formulating the events of 19371 included one. 
wage. because the United States Steel Corporation and so�e other 
steel industries were formed by mergers. Tha wages between the workers 
in the same level. having the sama job diff�red and served as the basis 
for complaints alleging iniquities. Also, secondly, neiJ' technological 
development affecting equipment, reaterials, processes. products, and 
work assie;nment had tended to accumulate wago rat0 dislocations. 
Thirdly, there were the hourly paid jobs, and workers in these jobs 
were �.a.king better w1ges than the regular workers. Fourth, the 
uniform work week lowered the take-horns pay of workers on continuous 
operations relative to other departments. Consequently. the first 
agreel'l'lent was negotiated in 1937 between the U.S. Steel Corporation 
and the Steel Workers' Organizing Co:mttee (SwOC). 
Grievances had been increasing during the period of 1939-41. A 
1941 agreement dealt with rate establisbman� and adjustment. There 
were two points of view--the Union's and the Company. The Union's 
.main point of view was equal pay for similar work throughout the steel 
industry, and its second object was wage equality between plants. 
The Company's main regard was to correct intra plant iniquities. Thus 
the 1941 agreemsnt with U.S. Steel recognized that the Company would 
use job evaluation and industrial engineering methods in setting rates 
for new jobs. Formerly, steel wo�kers had accepted job evaluation 
and bargained within the framework of specific evaluation programs 
on many occasions. 
1stiebar, Jack, �Steel Ind�st�y 1!2.N.e Structll!"e, ! Studv of 
the Joint Union-Management �Evaluation P�ogr� :1:!2 th0 &!.sic Stael 
Industry, Harvard University Press, Kass., 1959. pp. 3-12. 
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Then a 1942 agreement contained the p�ovision for arbitration 
of grievances over new and changed.jobs. The 1942 contract provided 
for the first joint effort by the Union and U.S. Steel to study and 
eliminate wage rate iniquities. Host of the 1942 :igreements contained 
provisions for reopening negotiations upon notice by either pa�ty, 
and in the event the parties failed to agree upon proposed changes 
within a specified time (20 or JO days in most cases), the agreements 
would be terminated. 
Method 
Tha board's directive order specified four steps to be followed 
by the parties in eliminating iniquities; description of the jobs, 
place�znt in proper relationship, reduction of classifications to the 
smallest practicable number, and the establishment of wage rates 
in accordance with guideposts set forth in the directive order. 
The Cooperative Wage Study (CWS) 
The 1942 U.S. Steel manual reported joint commission negotiations 
that were exceedingly complex and could not be understood by most 
steel workers. Some months after the union°s joint commissions 
had broken up, several majo� steel companies formed a group to explore 
, . 
.. 
the possibilities of a cooperative study of the iniquities problem. 
As a result, the CWS was established in Pittsburgh at the end of 1943. 
Also a CWS manual was designe<i for production and maintenance jobs in 
the steel industry. An atte�pt w�s mad� toward simplicity so that it 
might be understandable to the aver�ge e�?loyee. 
The objective of CNS was to C.otermL . ..:; the wage :: .. "::.·..:.� si tua ti on 
in the Companies, determine what it should be, an� determine ways 
and means of bringing about such correctic�s when r.ecess�ry. 
Its �pproach was: (1) set a manual cl�s�ifying steel jobs which 
would be applicable to steel industry generally; (2) discover the 
underlying wage structure of the steel industry as a whole; and 
21 
(3) its approach was based upon the assumption that there existed 
a general wage structure for the basic steel industry which in 
varying degree would reflect job relationships in individual steel 
plants and companies; and finally, ( 4) the CWS technicians believed 
that designing wage structure was beyond the scope of job eval:ua­
tion. They preferred to discover and utilize the waights for 
various job factors which had been developed in the steel industry 
through "the impact of the community labor market, the ups and downs 
of business cycles, hundreds of thousands of individual judgments 
and individual bargaining, as well as collective bargaining." 
In order to determine factor weights, all jobs were divided 
into three classes: (1) those paid hourly rates with no incentive, 
(2) those paid hourly rates considered to be dquita.ble and having 
incentive earnings above the hourly .rates and (3) jobs paid straight 
piece work or tonnage rates and having no guaranteed hourly rate. 
The plan itself served four purposes: (1) their ranking 
,,. 
helped to determine the number of factor. levels and the maximum 
level needed in each factor to cover the field; (2) their class-
ifications and rates were used to determine the final factor weights, 
(3) these jobs were designated 0banchmarks," an integral part of the 
plan to be . used in classifying other jobs, and (4) bonchwork jobs 
served to test the adequacy of the plan _upon its cc�-.:::;>:.CJtion. 
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Period IV--1946-1959 
In 1946 the Union demanded a wage increase of 18t¢ an hour. U.S. 
Steel was offering 15¢. An industry-wide strike started January 21, 
and was settled February 15, with a resulting 18i¢ wage increase, 
which followed the modification of government wage-pric0 policy to 
permit an immediate $5.00 a ton increase in steel prices. The 
contract between U.S. Steel and the Union was reopened in April, 
1947, and again in June, 1948, and the two settlements were peace-
fully resulted in small wage increases. 
The easy way of negotiating a contract almost every year was 
due to the fact that there was shortage of steel workers during this 
period. An additional factor was the increase in the cost of living 
which exerted pressure from the members on Union le�ders for wage 
increases. 
A new contract was achieved in 1950 without a strike. By 
this time the Korean War was going on. A system of economic controls 
was established. Thora was a separation between prices and wages; 
price·control was administered by an organization responsible to the 
president; wage control was put in the hands of an independent· 
tripartite board. Negotiations with steel companies led by U.S. 
Steel and the Union started in November, but made no progress. It 
became evident that the companies wera seeking to do their bargain-
ing not with the Union, but with the government and not over wages 
1 but over prices. 
1
Grant McConnell, Steel ��d the Presidency, 1962, W.W. Nortan 
& Company, Inc. New York; p. 58. 
23 
The Union's demand was wage increase supported by the recom­
mendation of the .-.rage Stabilization Board. However, the industry 
rejected the increase der:ianding to ma.intain both prices and wages 
or increase prices and wages. 
The president, finding himself in a bad position, decided to 
"seizen the steel mills in order to m.e.inte.in production. But the 
matter was taken to the U.S. Supretr.e Court which advised that the 
"seizure" was unconstitutional and the mills were retu:-ned. A 
strike broke out which lasted for 55 days. It ended in a large 
increase along with a large price increase. Two peaceful settle­
ments occurred in 1953-1954, through which worke�s received a 
substantial wage increase and steel prices were raised substantially. 
This time the government did not become a participant in the situa­
tion, and it continued on the basis of non-involvement and under­
standing between the parties to produce a new era of peace in the 
steel industry. 
By the end of 1956 the Union presented a set ·of large demands 
on the industry. The industry rejected these and a strike started. 
The government did not directly involve itself in the situation, 
although the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of the T�aasury 
communicated with the parties. The indust�y then, knowing that 
there was a growing �em.and for steel, signed a contract for three 
years which was accompanied by a price increase. 
Structure of Bar�ainin� 
The ba.!'gaining structure which the union was attemptir.� to 
gain was industry-!,ri.da bargaining. U.S .. Steel had been assu:U.ng 
the leadership in negotiations and s0ttl0�ents, and the other 
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companies tended to follow. U.S. Steel carried the burden of con­
flict with the Union over issues of principle to a greater extent 
than did the other companies. 
Between 1937 and 1941, the Union uas too weak to enforce any 
industry-wide bargaining. The Union was still an organizing committee 
with no per1�nent structure and little real influence. But in 1943 
the United Steel Workers of America was established. 
Thus, from 1942-1946, the Union was driving for the goal of 
industry-i:vide bargaining as an aid for securing its equal pay for 
equal work objective. Following the 1946 strike through 1954, the 
Union achieved some employ:nant through the job.evaluation program. 
The industry-wide goal was not accomplished because of some remaining 
area of wage differentials and other elements of resistance. 
In 1955 the first open and substantial move toward industry­
lri.de bargaining was achieved when the Union announced there would 
be a negotiating committee, and that all negotiations would be held 
in Pittsburgh. This com:nittee had met twice in 1956 and 1959 with 
a four-man industry committee representing twelve companies. 
Period V--1 959-1965 
Strike of 1 9  59 
Representatives of twelve steel com9anies undertook key ne-
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gotiations with the United Steelworkers of America. They proposed, 
on April 10,  1959 , that the contr�ct cue to ex-9ire or. June JO, be 
extended for an additi·::mal year rNith delati.-m of the provision for 
future autom:i.tic cost-of-living adjustments. 1 But the Union refused 
the project, and, on its side , offered a package deal. The two 
parties had met but no prograss was achieved, and a strike on July 1 ,  
seemed i�.rninent. However, the p�asident of the United States then 
intervened by requesting that the parties continue to bargain without 
interruption of production until a settlement was achieved. Still 
no progress was made and the strike started July 15. 
The companies' position was that they could not afford a wage 
increase without a product increase , in other words--a price in-
crease in steel industry. The companies stated that their ability 
to pay wage and other payment increases was 2% a year. 
This dispute had occurred during a period of growing national 
interest in ways of achieving both price stability and economic 
growth. Such public interest had put unusual strain on collective 
bargaining, more than in previous years,  it had been widely felt 
that the settlement in steel would affect wages and prices through­
out the country.2 
1 
Report of the President , the 1959 L.1bor Dispute in the Steel 
Industry, Submitted by the board of inquiry under executive order 
10843 and 10848, October 1959, p. 1. 
2 
Report of the President, Op. Cit . ,  p. 3. 
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Three incidents happened during the 1959 strike . They were : 
1) The strike was the longest strike in the history of the 
Steel industry--it lasted 116 d�ys. 
2) The strike could have lasted longer had the president 
of the United States not interfered. On October 20, he demanded 
an injunction, based on the national emergency provisions of the 
Ll1RA , requiring the steelworkers to return to their jobs for a 
period of eighty days . After court procedures ,  during an appeal 
by the Union, the injunction went into effect on November 7, at 
which time the U.S. Suprama Court decidE>d that the 116-day "strike 
imperils the national safety. ul 
3) A joint Human Relations Research Coru:uttee was established 
to study and recommend solutions to mutual problems relating to 
equitable wage and benefit adjustments , job classification, incen-
tive pay, protection of long-servic0 employees against lay-offs , 
medical care , and other problems.2 
The Kaiser Plan 
During the strike of 1 959, Kaiser Steel had suffered tra7 
mendous losses. Kaiser Steel was looking for solutions; thus they ..> 
sat down with the steelworkers to decide the details of the settle-
ment. The basic concept was to develop a plan which would provide 
a systematic means of resolving the basic distribution of the bene-
fits of economic progres s ,  thus eliminating th� periodic contract 
expirations and strike deadlines related to these economic issues.  
1 
W�ge Ch�onology, United St�tos Stec� Corporation, 1937-67, 
BU:..��tin if160J , July 196.8, U . S .  ��r�xc�� of L�bor, p .  24. 
2Ibid. , P• 26. 
In doing this, they came U? , ... -ith two very inter-related aspects: 
L The Long Range Cor.imittee 
II. The Long Range Sha.ring Plan 
I .  1'he Lorn;; Ranl?je Commit tee 
This committee was established on October 26, 1-159. It was 
composed of nine members , reprasenting three parties :  the Union, 
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the Company, and the public. There were three representatives from 
each party. The purpose of the committee was to provide a vehicle 
for the development of a long-range economic prog�am, specifically: 1  
1. Promote stability of employment. 
2 .  Safeguard employees ag&inst increases in the cost of living. 
3. Provide for equitable sharing of incrGased p�oductivity . 
4. Encourage the necessary eApansion of the company. 
The areas of its studies were pinpointed. 2 
1 .  Past experience and problems with technological change . 
2 .  ·An evaluation of the O?oration of the grievance procedure. 
3. Possible wider communication of sales anci production 
plans to employees .  
4. The advance dissemination to employees of information 
concerning plans for modernization, �uto�.ation, and expansion. 
5. A review of present incentives in the light of forth-
coming technological changes in the industry. 
6. The development of procedures which will operate to pre-
vent strikers. 
7 . The developmant of a �ea�s of shortening the benefits of 
econo:nic progre s s ,  including provisions for displaced employaes. 
1 
Gerald E .  Balsley, The Knisor Ste0l--United Steelma!-:ers of 
America, Long Ranges Sharing Plan, IR?� • • Boston 1 963, p .  50. 
2Ibid . ,  p .  51. 
II . The Long Ra.n�e Sharing_��an 
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Because Kaiser was a relatively newcomer,  they tried to have the 
new plans to encompass two main problems. The first was that of 
tho existing inequities between the employees .  The second problem 
was the long range one of providing equitable futuro distribution of 
gains . 
The committee worked on the plan, drew up the final draft and 
explained it to the employees. They voted on it. The result was 
three to one and the plan was put into effect on March 1 ,  1963. 
The plan gas to protect workers against job losses due to technical 
displacement and offered them one-third of any direct production 
saving. During the first ten months the plan was in effect , labor 
and material costs had been reduced by more than $9 million. 
�orkers received $3 million under the new plan for an average of 
46¢ an hour. 
1962 Agreement 
The memory of the 1959 strike, which had lasted for threa 
months, had euraged the new Damocratic administration elected in 
1960 to call the 1 1  companies and the Steelworkers in for early 
negotiation of the contract ending July 1962. Formal talks started 
February 14. 
The Union noted that the companies had made money "even when 
productivity fell balow 50% of capacity, ��1 due to an increasing 
demand. But , the companies noted that emplo�ent costs had risen 
12� over the previous three years p while productivity was up only 
6.Jf /:> •  The Union was dernar.din� 1 6¢ per hour, and the companies were 
1
George J .  JcHar.e.s, The Inside Sto::-v of Steel (.J:.ges and Prices 
1959-1967, Chilton Book Co . ,  Philadelphia,p. 36. 
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only offerJr":� 8¢. On March 31, after one or two breakdor,ms in ne-
gotiations, a settlement was announced. The formal contract had 
a nominal length of two years, but the Union could bargain and 
strike for practically anythin� after one year. The package was 
valued at 10¢ an hour for one year.1 
The government played a big role in bringing the two parties' 
points of view together by returning them to the bargaining ta:ble . 
each time discussion had ceased. It had been said the govern.�2nt 
never said "no" to wage increase and always said 0no" to price 
increases. 
The 1963 settlem3nt was a peaceful one. The Huwzn Relations 
meetings had begun after the 1962 settlement. Its philosophy was 
that both sides were free to reverse themselves en any point; 
bargainers were free to explore without being committed. That 
philosophy had aided in resolving the problems of the pressures of 
contract' deadline , and the negotiations went very well. There was 
also an appeal from the President to the Steel Union to 0conduct 
itself in accord with its long-range interest, which is the national 
interest, price stability is the best thing for the steel industry 
and wage stability is the best thing for the steel union, 112 
The official announcement of the contract came on June 20, 
1963 (the contract costing 15¢ over 21 months) . Also the idea · 
had been introduced of sabbatical leaves for workers on trips. 
and increasing vacations. The underlying idsa was that tha Union 
thought that be reducing the hours of work by the year, this would 
create additional job opportunities .  
1 
Ibid. ,  P •  39. 
2 
HcMa.nus , Op. Cit . ,  p.  86. 
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1 965 Contract 
The year 1965 h�d witnessed a split between the Union ° s  lead-
ers. so a Union election was h0ld o:n Fob:ru.a.:.ry 9 .  Never had there 
been a case involving a national election of a Union as big as the 
Steelworkers. Hhen one side claimed an election victory. the other 
vowed to carry their battle t�rough to the bitter 0nd. The com-
par�es did not even attempt negotiations with a divided Union. All 
negotiations ceased. A conflict a�fected by this concerned two 
can companies--the American Can Co. and the Continental Can Co. 
However .  negotiations were resumed on February 23. The companies 
offered a three year package with a 16¢ wage increase, more SUB 
and new pension benefits. The Union demand for 24¢ in wage plus and 
new plans for SUB and pensions had �en refused by the companies. 
On March 1 ,  a steelworkers0 st:.'ike 0rupted in the can companies, 
but on March 22, agreement was reached. The new contract was for 
forty months . The increase in wages was 26¢.1 Pensions were hiked 
from $) .25 a month to $5.50 a month fer each year of service .  SUB 
duration was increased to five yea�s for 1 0-year men and two years for 
5-year men. The cost of the package was esti�Ated at 45.7¢ by the Union. 
Other negotiations · involved tee basic steel industry=. On 1"1.arch 9 ,  
the talks ware resumed. and a week later the union presented a 
list on non-economic dew.ands. The demands called for the stream-
lining of grievanco procedures and measures to deal with grievance 
backlogs, among other things. After another waek, the Union pre-
sentod a second set of demsnds, this time econ�rnic on.-)s.  These 
included two general wage increases of 1 2 . 5¢ an hou�, an added 
1 
Mc!-1.anus, Op. Cit . ,  p .  148. 
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10� for all jobs not covered by inccntives0  cost-of-living adjustments , 
and a guarc::.ntee that rr.en transferred to lo-.vc:.. jobs would receive 9 5� 
of their old psy. It also included six new pension provisions 
and four SUB de!':lands .1 
While it was true tha t there was a split in the Union, one thing 
for certain was that negotiations with the basic steel industr.v had pulled 
the Union effort tog0ther to assure so�e degree of bargaining unity. 
The deadline for a strike was ¥i.ay 1 .  The companies, · on Aoril 
1 5 ,  proposed an open-end extension to run &t least 60 days after 
Vi.a.y 1 ,  but the Union said 0no. 0 A fow days later the Union me.de 
new offers to rr.eet with the governmsnt guideline of ).2%.  The cc�-
panies refused it. Reaching no agreen:�nt, the Steelworkers Wage 
Policy Com ... inittee authorized a strike . After s o!T.e talk, the strike 
deadline was extended four months--ur.til Septemoor, and the Union 
had to serve notice by August 1 ,  if it wanted to go out Septembar 1 .  
Although steelworkers in the local a.rea did not like the new arrange-
, 
ment, they agreed that spring was the best tima to strike , not the 
fall. The local co�pany had negotiated a contract with local Union 
officials and international representatives ,  but Union msmbers 
voted against the ag:r0em0�t and w0nt on strike . 
At this same ti."':le, steelworkers wQ..-.a nogotia ting with the alumi-
num companies , represented by Alcoa. In d�awing up that contract, 
the Union negotiating group was divided--with one side accepting 
the companies• offers, and the other ba�gaining for more b3nefits . 
The strike deadlir.e wc..s June 1 ,  but on M:ly 31 , an agreG!nent ·was 
reached and the new contl'"act with c.lu.":'linum c ompanies was signed for 
three years. The full contract was p�iced at about 50¢ over the 
Ibid . ,  p .  1 50 .  
' . 
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· tm.e' JMr8 .for a y.arl.J' coat 'increase •<>MW.re in t.be  neighborhood 
• r 
ot ,..  ·. · ·. 
' 
I 
On the one band tml"e � -P• the new contract and on the othe-1•. band . : . 
� 
-�- . ;;t��.--�:--.:�� 
. . 
there waa a prio• increase. TMre W.a � gonrnmnt reaction tO ti. 
alwlinwa �r1•. inc�•• beoauae tbe new c�ntraot •ttl••nt bad bee� 
over the 3.� gOftm.nt guid911m. · ... _ 
: ID the .ba sic steel .1.nduatey 1 � argumnt ran aa tollowa: the 
. Union ••� tor � inc:rease , the compani•• ottere�· onlJ 2$. The 
BruNu o.� Labor Statiatioa bad endorMd 2$, and ·� Council. ot Eoonamlo 
. . 
Advi.•or• oam out with 'J'/..  The 'Onion, aa wll as the oompaniea, ws un-
1 ha� with. � 3� guideline. The two pal"tie• again ·atter.._.:>ted negotiat1on.s. 
. , 
wt the7 wre as tar apart .. •• tbe7 bad been 1n April. ·z:aU. • . on. Av.gut 1 .  
tbe •trib notice •• Mrved. It w.s not �til Aups-\:, 25, when ·the cca-. ' ·  
p&ni•• b&d a new ofter, that •mplo,y.nt cos�s would ri ... v at tb9 rate ot 
']f. tor 35 aontha. n. CAM to 4o.6;. The Union ariueC:.. ��lat it came to . · . · 
' 
. � 37.f;· and not tor a period of 35 aontba, but tor ;,·;> lllOlltha. Thi• : . 
• ¥ •• 
. ..n. the rate ot increase -· onl.T 2.�. . 
. . 
A ted9ral •diator •• asaipd the task ot bringi:·.z the two 
·•1<»• together, but be tailed. So, the whole i••• V&s :: :�sMd on to 
tbe preaidilnt. · The preaic»nt bad three oaauMntas (1) a�t<.'c:-moni:b . . \ . . -
ate•l atri.D would haw as much lispact aa a reoes•ion ot CJ or 9 ' . . 
aontha; (2) at.eel pq bad risen 188� •inc• 1954 and was ))� .ibove 
. . 
the awrap tor all manufacturing; �nd ()) at.eel profit in ·i:.C.e tirst.. 
halt wa• up 3$ tram tt. pMvioua 19a.r and· 1� trom 1961.1 · . . . 
Tb9 pre•id8nt bell•� that an · a1reement could be reached · 
. r . . . 
right a•7, so the two pa�iea worked O"Ontinually tor two days. 
'1Mll7 the aonr:rnant bad t.·o 'give the ex·::.��a madg•. and an agree­
•nt re.aulted-•thpugh mitber aim •• sa ·i;.istied. 
llb1d • •  P• 177. 
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One of the factors that affected the negotiations of 1965 was the 
split between the Union° s l::iaders. David J. 1-:cDon�ld, the president of 
United Steelworkers of America , was challenged by I.S. Ab3l. secretary­
treasurer of the steelworkers . Pl"esidential elections were held in 1965 
and it was quickly apparent that Abel had strong backing fror.i within 
the organi zation. 
The opposition to M�. McDonald was based upon: ( 1 )  the centralized 
power at the command of Mr. McDonald and his staff and the rank and file 
was not heard from at any r.egotiations ; (2)  He was charged with being too 
friendly with management and his approach had eliminated elected officers 
from the bargaining. This had affected bargaining, which was rapidly 
becoming a science. Also. the Hum.an Relations programs intended to 
elevate technical specialists and staff people did baco�e more important . 
(3)  It was also charged that the negotiations of 1962 and 1963 were in­
ferior because local conditions did not i�prove ; steel pay was lagging.1 
( 4) A final item against Mr. McDori.ald concerned his personal life . 
Since he traveled ( first class ) ,  played golf, kept � Palm Springs home 
and frequented nightclubs , many workers felt that he had turned his 
back on them. 
Tho Pattern of Collective B:lrgaining: 1959-1965 
Collective bargaining in basic steel industry had been highly praised 
for its peaceful settlerr.ents in 1962 and 1963. A strike si:nilar to that 
of 1959 had been avoided, and friendly talks resulted. 
The Unions and the steel industry h�d both learned a lesson from 
the 1959 strike . They had assu_�ed that in the Hu.man Rel�tion Com­
mittee the demand for steel w�s inelastic. Ttus a strik0 , even a 
temporary halt of production. would net affect the demand. To their 
1Ibid. , p.  142. 
surprise , as a result of the 1959 st�ike , they d�scoversd that the loss 
irr business rr�y have exceeded the i�.::lediate loss in p�oc�ction because of 
� 
stri'.<e-induced changes in custorra.ry buying habits .... The loss in b'J.sin�ss 
was due to the change to competini �.aterials and to i�ports . It was 
not a loss in business, but also in work opportunities .  
The Hmnan Relations Com.rnit·::.ce had bc0n utiliz0d to avoid not 
only strike s ,  but customer anticipation cf strikes.  It worked 
satisfactorily in the two settlements of 1962 and 1963. To achieve 
this result, other things wera igno�ed. in tl:e negotiations of tho 
new contracts; such items as seniority roles,  creatio� of an in"<:.er-
plant jobs opportunities program, and s o  forth. 
Tho Hurr�n Relations Committee w&s headed by the two chief 
negotiators of the companies and the U�ion. ?o make the 1962 and 1 963 
negotiations peac.aful , they deleted the second rank of international 
union leadership , as well as the local union leadership, from the 
negotietion process, appearing to e::Jha�ce the role of the "technicians" 
who worked under the coil'.mittee. That was c0:tain2.y one factor that 
helped to defeat the Union leader in the re-election of 1965. 
Afte.r chc.nging Union leadors in :.. 965, the P.umc.n Relations Cow..rriittee 
was replaced by what they called th0 Hurr�n Relations Ru2.es . 2 These 
apply to the entire party to raise any issue, whether or not previously 
raised, in any arbitration which would result in failure to reach 
agreement. 
1 
David E .  Foller, Proceedings of t�e 21 st An.�ual �inter Mseting 
IRRA, Chicago, DJcember,  1968, p.  156. 
2Ibid . ,  p. 157. 
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Conclusion to the First Part 
In su"Tl!Tlary, the Union took more than fifty years to accomplish 
the goal of uniformity and nationwide bargaining. Until 1955, the 
positions of the parties were precise . That i s ,  the Union favored in­
dustrial bargaining, and the industrial opposition preferred to negotiate 
on a company-to-company basis. The companies had prev0nted any efforts 
of the Union to accomplish its g�l be dis�issing and Blacklisting Union 
membe rs, espionaee, and cutting all roots between the workers and the 
Union. Although the co�panies had tried to win the workers over to 
their side by raising wages and i.�proving working conditions, the 
workers continued to harbor animosity and hostility which resulted from 
their lack of unionized b9.rgaining power. The Union was ,  and still i s ,  
a sign of power t o  the worker which counteracted the power o f  the 
management who was exploiting them. 
The popularity of the union was moving in the same direction as 
that of the business cycle. When the cycle was at its peak, the manage­
ment could not afford to fight the workers because they were needed. 
However ,  when the cycle began to fall , the union was forced to liquidate, 
for now the management could retract the benefits which had been previously 
given to the worker .  
Since 1 91 7 ,  ·the government, i n  a n  attempt t o  secure the sup-
port of the workers, had encouraged them to form a Union of their 
choice . But it was not until 1933 that the law finally passed, and 
even then the man�gement did not accept the idea of unionism. Within 
the next nine year s ,  the management came. to raalize that they had to 
tolerate the existence of unions. Then in 1942, it had been said that the 
U . S .  Steel Company aided Philip Murray in establishing the United 
Steelworkers of America. 
As time p!l.ssed, the govzrnmcnt becam0 more involved in the 
dispute between the U .S.�.A. and t�e companies. Three such major 
disputes occurred in 1959, 1962, and 1965 in which Eisenhower ,  
Ken.'led.y, and Johnson , respectively, were deeply involved. 
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After the steel workers rGach the::.r goal, what is next? How 
does collective bargaining really work? Does -wage affect employ­
ment? If wages rise, does that mean employment increases also? 
Answers to these questions comprise the topic of the next thesis. 
Introduction to the Second Part 
·rhis part of the paper deals ""ith the wa�e theory and the 
factors which affect the labor wage s .  ·11age setting results from 
dynamic i:nplications . For example . the presence of relatively 
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higher w�ges among unionized frims in an industry might truly reflect 
greater bargaining pressure applied by these firms • . than the market 
wage pressures among the unorganized firrns ; however. higher wage firms · 
might be more susceptible to organization than lower wage firms so 
that the organization of the high wage firms might have reflected 
favorable market conditions for organization. 
The problem is complex. There is no single answer to it . 
There is more than one factor involved. It is hard to show how 
much one factor may accomplish apart from. and perhaps in opposition 
to. the other. These factors are: wage behavior. market structure 
and government intervention. The empirical study tries to corrollata 
these factors together in an attempt to learn what is the most signi­
ficant factor in determing wageS in a particular period of time in 
the steel industry. 
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Wap;e Behavior 
Th� wage behavior depends on the interaction between demand 
and the characteristics of the waf,e--setting institutions through 
which changes in aggregate demand are transmitted. 
The traditional concept of a purely competitive labor market 
visualized wages as the result of market forces tending to bring 
about an equilibrium of the demand and supply at the c ompetitive 
wage. That wage rate, according to this competitive market approach, 
i s  the norm from which deviations occur, a temporary situation; and 
equilibrium should be restored again. The traditional concept of 
perfect competition is explained under the assumption of full 
employment. 
In practice , perfect competition does not exist, especially 
not in the labor market .  �'laf;es tend to be inelastic in the do"Vmward 
direction; in otherwords , wages are not sensitive to demand and supply 
condition, and do not sto':') rising when there is unemployment. 
The demand for any par-ticula:c typo of labor is derived from the 
demand for its product which depends on the tastes and purchasing 
power of the consumers. Also, the nature of tho derived demand for 
labor depends on the technical c'.'.>ndition of production. From this 
statement we can come up with four variables correlated with wage 
1 changes in the industry: 
A .  Changes in employment 
B. Average profit level 
C .  Industrial Concentration 
D. Unionization 
1 
William G .  Bmven, \rfage Behavior in the Postwar Period. An Emoerical 
Analvsis ;  Industrial Rel�tions Section . Princeton University. � . J . ,  p. 65 . 
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A .  Chan�e s  ?-..!!......�:nnlo.'{!'.lent 
William Bowe n ,  in his empirical study of �v:l.ge behavior in the 
postwar period came up with these conclusions : 1 
A .  The relationship between the level of unemployment and 
money wage increase is thr.1.t wages risa faster when unemployment is 
relatively low rather than when unemployment is relatively high. 
B. There i s  no way of measuring how :nuch unemplo,yment will be 
enough to keep wa�es from increasing. 
C .  Wage behavior i s  influenced not only by the level of un­
employm&nt but also by the direction in which unemployment rates are 
moving . At a given average level of unemployment . wages rise much 
less rapidly when unemployment i s  increa ,;ing than when unemployment 
i s  decreasini;. 
D. The fact that wagas are respor.sive to significant variations 
in the level of unemployment and to steady increase in the level of 
unemployment does not mean, howeve r ,  that wages fall readily. 
B .  Average Profit L� 
There is a relationship between profits and wage increases. The 
explanation of this is that high-profit firms are more likely to grant 
large wage increases than low-profit firms . 
There is a strong relationship between profit and wages ,  wages and 
unionization, and wages and concentration. However ,  there is also a 
relationship between profits and unionization and profit and concentration 
so the cause is not clear. 
1Ibid. ,  p .  85 . 
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C .  Industrial Concentration 
The more highly concentrated industries have produced the largest 
wage increases because of the strong interdopendance between tho 
degree of industrial concentr�tion and the average level of �rofits , 
and because of the widely recognized tendency for high industrial 
concentration and a high degree of unionization to go together. 
D. Unionization 
There is no simple relationship between unionization and wage incraases1 
unless it is directly joined with wage concentration and profitability. 
At any rate, unions seem to have more of a positive effect on industry 
w1ges in low unemployment periods than in recessions. 2 The amount of 
. 
wage increase a Union demands and succeeds in obtaining is itself a function 
of the employer' s demand for labor, his profit position, and his ability 
to pass on high wages in the form of higher prices .  
It is true that a high degree of industrial concentration and 
a high degree of unionization tend to occur together in :nany industries 
just as low concentration and low unionization tend to characterize 
other industries.  
Market Structure 
The rate of rising prices or increase wages depends really on 
the market structure of both the goods and labor. There are four 
types of combinations between the two markets. 
1 ) Both markets are competitive, 2) Competitive product market 
and monoposonistic labor market, J) }1onopolistic product market and 
1 
Ibid. ,  p .  72. 
2 Ibid. ,  p . 91 . 
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competitive labor ��rke t ;  and 4) monopolistic product market and 
monoposonistic labor market. 
Unions have becoroo powerful ·organizations by organizing all 
workers within its jurisdiction. A Union attempts to gain monopoly 
control over the labor supply of that trade or industry. So, if the 
union is controlling the labor market supply, we have one of t�o 
cases ; either monopolistic or co�petitive product market. In the 
case of steel industry, it is obvious that the product market is a 
monopolistic one. 
It has been argued that United Steelworkers of America im?oses 
the terms of a key bargain unif or:nly on all the many and varied 
firms with which it bargains , regardless of industrial classification, 
size, location, competitive circumstances, or financial conditions. 
Those conditions make the union a monopoly. So�e people also 
oppose the Union-wide bargaining because it cannot take into considera-
tion the local �roblem, the working conditions, and little problems 
related to local firms. 
Mr. George Seltzer made an empirical study in the basic steel 
1 
industry between 1946-1950 to prove whether or not the United 
Steelworkers of America are a n1abor monopoly. 0  He found out that 
United Steelworkers of America do not seem to support the charge , 
for the following reasons: 
1 .  The application of the key bargain in basic steel is most 
effective in the integrated units , where it serves almost as a rule , 
1 
George Seltze r ,  "Pattern .Bargaining and the United Steelworkers , "  
The Journal of Political Econ�mv. August 1951 ; p .  320. 
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and least effective in the nonintagrated units , where it servos as 
a goal. 
2 . The immediate e ffectiver.ess of tho key bargain outside the 
integrated units decreased duri�g the period studied. 
) . The key bargain is most effective with respect to the 
amount of wa�e increase and less effective with respect to fringe 
items and minimum wag� levels .  
Wage uniformity within the basic st�el industry i s  produced by 
at least three types of forces :  labor and product market conditions , 
government action, and collective bargaining. So the 1947 and 1 948 
settleinents continued the trend toward the equalization between 
firms of minimum rates but reversed the trend toward the equalization 
of average wage levels. One force alone cannot affect the wage 
uniformity. 
Government Intervention 
The government may intervene with one or more of the following 
objective s :
1 
( 1 )  To avert or stop a strike if it threatens a national 
emergency; (2) To aid in the process of bargaining and facilitate a 
settlement; and ( 3) To encourage terms of settlement believed to be 
more in accord with the public interest than a privately negotiated 
settlement. 
In the case of the steel industry, history showed the government 
had not intervened until recently, since 1935, tho government has 
intervened or exerted influence , in all of the major steel strikes 
to achieve one or more of these objectives .  
1 
Livernash, Op. Cit. ,  p .  9 .  
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·rhe government intervention plays a role in noe;otiations . It 
can take one of two forms , the traditional form of proposing terms 
of sattlemont or what they call it high-level mediation, its purpose 
is to move each party from fix0d positions . The government can 
use its power for economic or political reaso�s. Ex.am9le : For 
economic reasons , the government can influence a wage settlement 
in order to stabilize wages and prices to meet with the economic 
framework of the whole country·, and to control inflation. 
For political reasons, when wartime demands for steel are great 
and a steel strike occurs, the g.ovarnment intervenes in the negotiations 
on behalf of national defense . 
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Summary of the Second Pnrt 
In this part of the paper, it has been explained that wages are 
not set in automatic response to supply and demand forces of labor 
market. There are several factors th.:1t affect the labor market. 
These factors are: wage behavior, market structure , and govern:nent 
intervention. 
Wage behavior depends on at least four factors : changes in 
employment, average profit level, industrial concentration, and union­
ization. It cannot be claimed that one of these four factors has 
more power than the other , or if other things are constant, can 
change the wage behavior. It cannot be decided how much unemploy­
ment would be enough to keep wa�es fro::n increasing or how much profit 
helps the increase. Also, wherever there is industrial concentration, 
there is unionization, too. 
Market structure is not only the market for the product, but 
also the market for labor. It rr�kes a differance in negotiations 
to know if the labor market is competitive or a monopoly. That is 
from the point of view of the industry. Also, it makes a difference 
from the point of view of the labor negotiator to know if the product 
market is competitive or a monopoly. The industry might be more 
lenient in acceptine wage increases if it knows that the labor 
market is a monopoly than if it knows that it is a cnmpetitive . 
On the other hand , if laborers know that they nogotiate with a 
competitive indust�y, chancos for wage increases are very slim 
unless this particular fir�• s workers are underpaid, except if the 
other competitive firms increasa wages of its workers . But, if it is 
a monopolistic industry the story is different. 
Governmont intervention has b·:en o. source of conflict. It 
aopears to be mor� resented by the industry than the Union. 
Tho innustry has objected that intervention h;�s more often com­
promised the industry 9osition. Eo'."ever,  the Union in 1959 felt 
that the injunction considerabl,V favored the companies .  
It should be mentioned here that up to 1962 the government 
used to send a mediator to attend the nagotiations to prevent the 
situation from getting out of hand. In 1962. the governTient inacted a 
new way of intervention, the wage-price guidepost, which recommended 
wage increases not more than the percentage increase in the national rate 
of productivity growth. The guideposts were in practice until 
1967. That did not �top the government fro� using the formal 
method during this period. 
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THE PROBL�M 
The traditional wage theory is based on the "!Tlarket mechanism: 
wages depend on the market supply and demand fo� labor. Such 
analytical framework i s  appropriate for explaining wage determination 
under simple , commodity-like conditions of employrrient. Unemployment 
is either frictional , or it arises from rieid money wage . 
Following the traditional theory, A .  l'1. Phillips came up with 
new hypothesis to be applied at the macro level; th�t i s ,  the rate 
of chan�e of money wage rates can be explainod by the level of 
. .  unemployment. The rate of change of wai:;es will be approximately 
proportional to the excess demand for labor. His curve is 
empirically determined. It relates wages change , the dependent 
variable , to the unemployment level, the independent variable . 
Sharp changes in wages take place for a given unemployment 
change when unemployment is low, smaller wage changes occur when 
unemployment levels are higher. 
This paper is an attempt to apply Phillip' s curve in the basic· 
steel industry. The basic steel industry was chosen for the follow­
ing reasons : 
1 .  Because this industry is highly unionized, meaning that 
wages are determined by negotiation and not by the free forces 
of the · market. 
2 .  Because the government has increased its intervantion in 
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the disputes of the steel industry, for steel has strategic importance 
as a basic component in defense mechanisms. 
The hypothesis is thi s :  The percenta�e chanv,e of wages is 
a function of the percentage change in the rate of unemployment, 
plus the rate of unemployment, plus the percentage change in the 
imports of steel, plus the government intervention, plus the effect 
of the unions . 
From a statistical point of view, a major difficulty in 
evaluating the effect of unions on wages is the measurement of 
the unionism variable . Another difficulty is the measurement of 
government intervention. 
fua 
The dependent variable i s  the percentage change in wages .  
For this figure , the average weekly earning figure is used. It is 
arrived at by multiplying average weekly hours by average hourly 
earnings. To get the quarterly average weekly earnings figure , 
the three months average weekly earnings are added together and 
then divided by three .  The percentage change in wages in calculated 
from the difference between two consecutive quarters . 
Therefore . weekly earnings are affected not only by changes 
in the length of the workweek ,  but also by part-time work, stop­
pages for varying causes ,  labor turnover ,  and absenteeism. 
The average weekly earnings are chosen because they include 
the hourly wage which is negotiated by the union contract times the 
hours . Also, they include overtime which is positively correllated 
with output and employment. This bias is favorable to observing 
a negative correllation between wage change and unemployment. 
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The rate of separation is used fol .. the rate of unemploy-
ment because the latter figure could not be found for the industry. 
Separations aro termin�tions of employment during the calendar month 
and are classified according to cause : quits, layoffs , and other 
causes . The quarter rate of separation is the avera1';e of the 
three months separation. 
Imports are used as an independent variable because the 
imports of the steel have increased since 1959. The figure used 
is a percentage of im;iorts fro:n the apparent supply , the apparent 
supply is the domestic shipments excluding exports , plus imports. 
The effect of the union on wage change appears in the years 
of the contract negotiation. To measure its effect, a dummy 
variable is used with a value of one to represent the quarter of nego­
tiation and a value of zero for the rest of the quarters . Wage changes 
are expected to be higher in the yea r of negotiation. 
The government effect on wage change can be tested, using 
w1ge-price guidepost which has been in effect fro� 1962 up to 1967. 
The wage-price guidepost is simply a wage increase , uniform throughout 
industry by a percentage equal to the national trend-rate of productivity 
( output per man hour) growth. 1 A du:mny variable is used for the years 
that the wage-price guideposts were in effect. 
The years used for this data are 1958-1968, mainly eleven years 
divided into four quarters . These years were chosen because the separation 
rates ·are not available before 1958. The first year has three quarters. 
This means that we have forty-three ·observations . 
1 
Perolman, Labor Theory, John wiley & Sons , Inc. New York, 1969, p .  224. 
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T.\?:V.!: I .---���---����l��-ar-.-I� ·, Va-r-.-I-I�f�v-a-r-.-I-I� �r. IV I 
I j ' YEAR 
1958 
1959 
1960 
I 1961 
1962 
1963 
. 
1964 
1965 
J
S�CE�TAG E p�"'.RC�.�T:\G3 AV�?.AG:!: I FU\.Ti<: OF Tr{!� 
CHA�GE HjCl:LA.NGE IN l RATE Of" u1'11-CHANGE IN purDEPOST 
1:!.\GE RATE'i�A T11� Oft' U�J.E!t.PLOTIBN'Ii L'1PORT 
tr . . !Sl'1D! O�·�NT 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
3 . 06 
9 . 37 
2 . 29 
6.11 
4.81 
1 . 75 
2 . 55 
5.27 
6 . 31 
5 . 17 
2.18 
3.83 
7.85 
3 40 . 
1 .89 
4.19 
5.00 
3.09 
.70 
3 . 68  
1 .06 
2 .89 
2 .08 
3.44 
3.01 
2 . 72 
.39 
1 . 64 
3 . 30 
4.19 
6.04 
I 
46.43 
13.33 
30.77 
27.78 
7 . 69 
00 .00 
1 . 6 
31 .25 
114 .29 
1 3 . 33 
7 .84 
45.45 
40.00 
27 78 . 
17.39 
37.04 
211 . 76 
18.87 
20.93 
41 .18 
15 .00 
100.00 
31 .82 
40.00 
1 6 . 67 
60.00 
29 .17 
5 .88 
12 • .so 
1 1 6 . 67 
1 2 .82 
I 
I 
I 
3 . 0  
2 . 6  
1 .8 
1 . 3  
1 .4 
0 . 0  
1 .6 
2 .1 
4 . 5  
5 . 1  
5 . 5  
3 . 0  
1 .8 
2 3 . 
2 . 7  
1 . 7 
5 . 3  
4 . 3  
3.4 
2 . 0  
1 .7 
4.4 
3 . 0  
1 .8 
1 . 5  
2 .J.i-
1 . 7 
1 . 6 
1 .8 
1 .9 
4.4 
I 
1 f 
t 
2.9 
2.9 
2.9 
6.1 
6 . 1  
6 . 1  
6 . 1  
4.7 
4 . 7  
4 . 7  
4 . 7  
4.7  
4 . 7  
4 7 . 
4 . 7  
5 . 6  
5 . 6  
5 . 6  
5 . 6  
6.9 
6.9 
6.9 
6.9 
7 . 3  
7.3  
7.3  
7.3  
10.3  
10 . 3 
10.3  
10.3  
I 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I I 
I 
I I 
Var . V 
;1!:4:GOTIA­
TI mTS 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
cont. 
-
I 
cont . . . I 1 966 1 f 7 . 21 I 2 3 . 68  I 3 . 03 I 4 2 . 37 
1967 1 ' . 08  
2 I 1 . 27 
3 2 . 67 
4 1 .89 
1968 1 3 . 78 
2 3.45 
3 4 .77 
4 1 .22 
Sources : 
59 . 09 ' i ..g ' ' oo . oo i 1 .8 1 1 1 . 1 1  3 . 8  I 
28 .95 I 2 . 7  3 . 70 2 . 6  
3 . 85 2.5  
36 . 00 3 .4 
97.06 6.7  
67 . 1 6  I 2 . 2  oo.oo 2 . 2  195.45 6 . 5  
53 .85 3 . 0  
1 0 .9 
10.9 
10.9 
1 0.9 
12.2 
I 1 2 . 2  
1 2 . 2  
1 2 . 2  . .  
1 6 .  7 
I 1 6 .  7 
1 6 . 7  
1 6 .  7 
. . 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Wage rate and separation rate are from "Employment and Earnings 
Statistics for the U .S.0  
Import figures charting stee l ' s  progress is from "American Iron 
and Steel Institute . u  
Empirical Finding 
The period of study ranges from 1958 to 1968. Nithin this period, 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
. 
the guideposts were in effect from 1962-1967. There were five contracts 
negotiated during the period of study. Two ·of the contracts were out 
of the period of the guidepost; one was in 1959, the other was in 1968. 
Table II contains the results of the basic steel industry' s 
multiple regression analysis for one dependent variable , the percentage 
change of average. weekly earning. The empirical finding shows that 
the variables are not statistically significant except for variable 
number 4 which ·represents the �uideposts. It is the only significant 
variable with at-value exceeding 2 ,  and being significant at the five 
per cent level. 
I 
! l 
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TABL� II 
Var.  Q.Q.r--ff. I Std . D�v .  Cor-ff. I T Value 
1 0.01 12 I 0 . 008?. I 1 .  '372'3 ' ··-
2 -0.0612 0. 2600 -0.2411 
'3 -0. 0929 0.0814 -1 /1415 
I 
4 -1 .4544 I 0.6120 -2.?,292 
5 -0.562'3 o. 7584 -0 .7415 
RESULT 
The Phillips hypothesis indicates that wage change is a function 
of unemployment. Wage change does not depend on th� marke't forces; 
but it depends on otha� factors, or.e of which is governrnent inter-
vention. The above result shows that the guideposts wera most in-
I 
I 
fluential factors during this period of time. The results are c onsistent 
with the hypothesis that market forces are not influential in steel 
industry. The government intervention importance is supported b� , 
the hypothesis .  while the union' s importance is not supported. It 
is possible that since the time period was short, the powor of the union 
was not evidenced. One positive factor is that the government had used 
the guideposts t o · exert more influence on w�gos in order to keep them 
from rising higher than the n�tional trend-rate of productivity growth. 
This result does not bare out Phillips hypothesis for steel 
industry. 
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Re-S UMm8. r.y 
The union took more than fifty years to accomplish the goal 
of uniformity and nationwide bargaining. Until 1955, the positions 
of the parties were precise ; that is. the union favored industry­
wide bargaining, and the companies preferred to negotiate on company 
by company basis. 
Since 1917, the government, in an attempt to secure the support 
of the workers, has encouraged them to form a union of their choice . 
However it was not until 1935 that an effective law finally passed. 
As time passed, the government became more involved in the dispute 
between the United Steelworker of America .and the companies .  Three 
such major disputes occured in 1959. 1962, and 1965 in which Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Johnson, respectively, were deeply involved. The govern­
ment intervention can take one of three forms : a form of proposing 
terms of settlement, mediation, and finally a new form which is the 
guideposts. The wage-price guideposts are simply a wage increases, 
uniform throughout . industry by a percentage equal to the national 
trend-rate of productivity growth. The guideposts were in effect 
between 1962-1967. 
The empiric�l finding shows that the guideposts are the only 
significant factor affecting wage changes during the period of study 
( 1958-1968) . Unionism and the rate ot unemployment have no significant 
effect on wage changes. 
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